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Municipal bonds have traditionally been considered, 
rightly or wrongly, mundane assets that require little 
regulation. However, the most recent financial crisis did not 
leave municipal bonds untouched. The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and 
liquidity requirements for banks, enacted in response to the 
2008 financial crisis, have had far-reaching effects in the 
banking industry as well as the municipal bond market. 
While the registration requirements for municipal advisors 
have garnered much attention, other provisions may 
negatively impact the liquidity of the municipal bond market 
and raise the costs of raising capital for municipalities. 
This Note focuses on three provisions, all of which increase 
the cost of raising capital for municipalities without a 
meaningful improvement in the safety of the banking system: 
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, the Volcker Rule, and the Risk 
Retention Rule. Secondarily, this Note makes mitigating 
suggestions. This Note concludes that the most liquid 
municipal bonds should qualify as eligible for high-quality 
liquid asset status, which would be consistent with 
international standards. Additionally, exemptions should be 
granted under the Volcker Rule and the risk retention 
provisions for tender option bonds. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 financial crisis ushered in a wave of new 
regulations designed to ensure the stability of the financial 
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system.1 In the United States, the enactment and 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) and 
the regulations inspired by Basel III2 to strengthen 
supervision and risk management in the banking sector have 
had far-reaching effects. One such area affected, the 
municipal bond market, traditionally had been subject to 
little regulation. Part of this might have been due to the 
perception that municipal bonds are boring, safe 
investments—Professor Theresa Gabaldon once referred to 
municipal securities regulation as the “antithesis of sexy,” 
with a “powerful soporific effect.”3 
This Note explores new bank regulations relating to 
municipal bonds and synthetic derivatives involving 
municipal bonds promulgated after the 2008 financial crisis. 
The analysis focuses on (i) regulations passed as a part of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and (ii) liquidity regulations modeled on 
Basel III. These regulations affect the participation rate of 
banks in the municipal bond market, which in turn 
influences the liquidity of the municipal bond market and 
 
1 See Ema Clark, The Dodd-Frank Act and Municipal Securities 
Regulation, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2011, 30 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 494, 497–98 (2011); CADMUS HICKS, NUVEEN ASSET 
MGMT., LLC, REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 
(Jan. 2014). 
2 Basel III is a  
comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to strengthen 
the regulation, supervision, and risk management of the 
banking sector. These measures aim to improve the 
banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress, whatever the source; 
improve risk management and governance; [and] 
strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures.  
International Regulatory Framework for Banks (Basel III), BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/Y7C5-J8VE]. 
3 See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, 
Happy Life of Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 740 
(2009). 
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the financing costs for municipalities.4 Unlike the markets 
for U.S. government securities and corporate bonds, which 
are “dominated by a wide variety of institutional investors,” 
the municipal bond market is largely retail-oriented.5 Thus, 
investors in the over-the-counter municipal bond market 
depend to a high degree on “robust market-making and 
liquidity intermediation activity by municipal bond dealers, 
the largest of which are banking entities.”6 Further, 
municipal bond issuances have skyrocketed in the last 
several decades, increasing this level of dependence. The size 
of the municipal bond market has exploded from $49 billion 
in 19757 to $3.7 trillion in 2011.8 Banks have become a larger 
player in the municipal bond market as well; banks held 
$416.4 billion of municipal bonds in 2013, almost double 
their holdings from 2009.9 Thus, how banks are regulated in 
the municipal bond market is important. 
This Note considers three regulations with a potential 
impact on the municipal bond market: (i) the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (“LCR”) requirement10; (ii) Section 619 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, commonly known as the Volcker Rule11; 
and (iii) Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(the “Risk Retention Rule”), also part of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.12 
 
4 See Citibank Glob. Mkts. Inc., Comment Letter on Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 2 (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www. 
sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-91.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S4F-SH3U]. 
5 Id. at 1. 
6 Id. at 1–2. 
7 See Gabaldon, supra note 3, at 740 (stating that “$25 to $49 billion 
of municipal securities were outstanding” in 1975). 
8 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL 
SECURITIES MARKET i (July 31, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
2012/munireport073112.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS4A-7295]. 
9 See Lynn Hume, Citi: Why Most Munis Are Liquid, THE BOND 
BUYER, Apr. 10, 2014, at 1. 
10 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 329.10, 329.20–.22 (2015). 
11 See Dodd-Frank Act § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). 
12 See Dodd-Frank Act § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2012).. 
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The three regulations may result in higher transaction 
costs without a meaningful improvement in the safety of the 
financial system. First, the LCR requirement discourages 
banks from holding municipal bonds by stipulating that 
municipal bonds will not be counted towards a bank’s 
stockpile of liquid assets. The LCR requires banks hold a 
certain amount of High-Quality Liquid Assets (“HQLAs”), in 
order to meet their obligations in times of financial crises.13 
Initially, no municipal bonds qualified as HQLAs, prompting 
concern that banks would be less inclined to participate in 
the municipal bond market if ineligible for HQLA 
qualification, which would result in increased borrowing 
costs for municipalities.14 In the first half of 2015, the 
Federal Reserve (the “Fed”), acting unilaterally, submitted a 
proposal to consider certain municipal bonds as HQLAs, but 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”) 
have declined to follow the Fed.15 A bipartisan coalition led 
 
13 See Ryan Tracy, U.S. Regulators Tweak Final Liquidity Rule for 
Large Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-
regulators-tweak-final-liquidity-rule-for-large-banks-1409753404 
[http://perma.cc/T3HM-4FPZ]. 
14 See Andrew Ackerman, Fed Will Consider Adding Municipal Debt 
as Quality Asset, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
moneybeat/2014/09/03/fed-will-consider-adding-municipal-debt-as-quality-
asset [http://perma.cc/UZR5-2J87] (“States and localities have warned 
excluding their securities could cause banks to retreat from the municipal 
market in which they have increasingly become an important player . . . . 
State Treasurers and other officials say their costs to finance roads, 
schools and bridges could jump if banks retreat from the market—costs 
that will ultimately be borne by taxpayers.”). 
15 See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Treatment of U.S. Municipal 
Securities as High-Quality Liquid Assets, 80 Fed. Reg. 30,383, 30,385 
(proposed May 28, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249); Andrew 
Ackerman & Victoria McGrane, Fed Is Expected to Shift on Muni Bonds, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-is-expected-to-
shift-on-muni-bonds-1429232200 [http://perma.cc/7YFM-AMTA] (“[T]he 
Fed’s decision is only a partial victory for the banks, state officials and 
lawmakers who had pushed for the change. The other two regulators, the 
[OCC] and the [FDIC], currently don’t plan to follow the Fed, people with 
knowledge of those agencies said.”). 
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by Rep. Luke Messer (R-Ind.) and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-
N.Y.) have also introduced legislation that would allow some 
municipal bonds, only those which are investment grade and 
actively traded in the secondary market, to be considered in 
the same tier as some sovereign debt and claims on U.S. 
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”) like Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac for the purposes of evaluating liquidity.16 
Messer and Maloney’s bill, H.R. 2209, was passed by the 
House with unanimous bipartisan support on February 1, 
2016.17 
Second, the Volcker Rule influences financing costs for 
municipalities by imposing restrictions on tender option 
bonds (“TOBs”)—synthetic derivative instruments involving 
municipal bonds. The agency regulation implementing the 
Volcker Rule restricts banks’ investments in “covered 
funds.”18 The Volcker Rule classifies TOBs as “covered 
funds,” putting TOBs in the same risk category as 
investments in hedge funds and private equity funds and 
effectively preventing banks from sponsoring TOBs.19 
Municipalities could face higher issuance costs as 
municipalities lose a source of demand for their bonds, 
though banks have been working to propose alternative TOB 
structures to sidestep the Volcker Rule provisions.20 The 
financial regulators responsible for implementing the 
Volcker Rule also contemplated that a subset of municipal 
 
16 See H.R. 2209, 114th Cong. (2015). 
17 Press Release, U.S. Congressman Luke Messer for the 6th Dist. of 
Ind., House passes Messer-Maloney Bill to Encourage Investment in Local 
Communities (Feb. 1, 2016) (on file with author). 
18 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5538 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts . 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
19 See Liz Farmer, What the Volcker Rule Means for the Municipal 
Market, GOVERNING (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/ 
finance/gov-what-the-volcker-rule-means-for-the-municipal-market.html 
[http://perma.cc/2RFY-7XAG]. 
20 See id. 
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bonds be ineligible for proprietary trading, but abandoned 
this interpretation in their final rule.21 
Finally, the Risk Retention Rule also influences the 
market for TOBs.22 The Risk Retention Rule stipulates that 
a sponsor or a securitizer of an asset-backed security (“ABS”) 
must retain at least five percent of the credit risk of assets 
collateralizing the issuance of the ABS.23 Despite opposition 
from industry officials, the final rule passed in October 2014 
includes TOBs within the definition of an ABS.24 Sponsors of 
TOBs would be required to retain at least a five percent 
interest in the TOBs, which would increase the costs of TOB 
issuances.25 
This Note argues that regulations promulgated since the 
financial crisis do not meaningfully create a sounder 
financial system, and only result in higher costs of raising 
capital for municipalities. This Note proposes that the most 
liquid municipal bonds be treated as HQLAs, that the 
Volcker Rule prohibition on covered funds exempt TOBs, and 
that TOBs also be exempt from the Risk Retention Rule. 
This Note does not delve deeply into the technical details 
relating to how TOBs are structured; instead, it attempts to 
explore the different ways in which municipal bonds are 
treated within the framework of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The Note proceeds as follows: Part II begins with a brief 
background regarding the municipal bond market and the 
recent heightened scrutiny on municipal bonds and defines a 
TOB. Part III describes the three new regulations: the LCR, 
the Volcker Rule, and the Risk Retention Rule. Part IV 
 
21 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. at 5645–46. 
22 See Joyce J. Gorman, Regulators Decline to Exempt TOBs from Risk 
Retention Rule but Add Helpful Revisions and Clarifications, BALLARD 




23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
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analyzes whether these regulations are sensible and 
meaningfully advance the safety of the financial system. In 
conclusion, this Note finds that the regulations are not 
sensible as they do not meaningfully make the financial 
system safer. Part V provides recommendations for 
modifications. Part VI concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Municipal Bond Market 
Historically, the municipal bond market, despite its size 
and importance, has not been subject to stringent 
regulation.26 Municipal bonds—“debt securities issued by 
states, cities, counties, and other governmental entities to 
finance capital projects, such as building schools, highways 
or sewer systems, and to fund day-to-day obligations”27—
remained mostly unregulated, even after the Great 
Depression, because issuers, almost all of which are 
nonfederal governments, strongly resisted federal 
regulation.28 The only noteworthy regulatory change before 
the 2008 financial crisis came in 1975, when Congress 
created the Municipal Securities Regulation Board (“MSRB”) 
in response to the near-bankruptcy of New York City.29 
However, even in establishing the MSRB, Congress 
constrained its power by not giving the MSRB enforcement 
powers of its own.30 Despite the historically relaxed approach 
to regulation, the municipal bond market is huge today, with 
the total aggregate principal amount of municipal bonds 
outstanding estimated to be around $3.7 trillion as of year-
 
26 See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at ii. 
27 See Investor Bulletin: Focus on Municipal Bonds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipal.htm 
[http://perma.cc/GQX9-732M]. 
28 See Philip Grommet, A Call for Action: An Analysis of the 
Impending Regulatory Crisis in the Municipal Securities Market, 38 J. 
LEGIS. 237, 245 (2012). 
29 See Clark, supra note 1, at 494–95. 
30 See id. at 495. 
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end 2011.31 Banks have come to occupy a larger share of the 
municipal bond market as well, with banks holding $416.4 
billion of municipal securities in the year 2013, almost 
double from 2009.32 
B. Recent Heightened Scrutiny of the Municipal Bond 
Market 
Recent events have called into question the market’s 
safety and security, which has brought about heightened 
regulatory scrutiny. Beginning with the 2008 financial crisis, 
municipal bonds began to default at a record pace.33 There 
have been a number of high-profile municipal bankruptcies 
with Stockton, California, San Bernardino, California, and 
Detroit among the municipalities declaring bankruptcy in 
the last few years.34 Other municipalities, such as Chicago 
and Los Angeles, face a growing burden from unfunded 
pension liabilities.35 None other than legendary investor 
Warren Buffett has warned that large-scale defaults for 
municipalities may be looming.36 At the state level in the 
 
31 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at i. 
32 See Hume, supra note 9. 
33 See Clark, supra note 1, at 497 n.27 (citing Tesia Nicole Stanley, 
Narrowing the Disclosure Gap: Is Emma Edgar for the Municipal 
Securities Market?, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 96 (2010) (“In 2008, 136 
defaults were recorded, totaling a record high of $7.5 billion.”)); see also 
Lisa Anne Hamilton, Canary in the Coal Mine: Can the Campaign for 
Mandatory Climate Risk Disclosure Withstand the Municipal Bond 
Market’s Resistance to Regulatory Reform?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1014, 
1018 (2010). 
34 See Opinion, The Muni Bond Lobby, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-muni-bond-lobby-1411426709 [http://per 
ma.cc/M8DF-2G7D]. 
35 See id. 
36 See Tom Petruno, Buffett Warns (Again) on Muni Bond Risks, but 
What’s Your Time Horizon?, L.A. TIMES: MONEY & COMPANY BLOG (June 2, 
2010, 6:14 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2010/06/warren-
buffett-muni-bonds-warning-terrible-problem-angelides-moodys-fcic.html 
[http://perma.cc/3R2A-J9FY]. 
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short term, annual expenditures outpace annual revenues,37 
and in the long term, sizable and growing public pension and 
healthcare obligations are causing fiscal stress.38 
Furthermore, the 2008 financial crisis fundamentally 
changed the municipal bond market. Pre-crisis, nearly fifty 
percent of municipal bonds were backed by monoline 
insurance39 providers, who guaranteed the principal and the 
interest payments with a “credit wrap.”40 Because municipal 
bonds generally had low default rates, monoline insurers had 
to have AAA credit ratings—what good is an AA-rated 
monoline guarantee on an already AA-rated bond?41 
However, in 2008, the monoline insurance industry began to 
unravel as monoline insurers had to cover huge claims on 
mortgage derivatives.42 As monoline insurers’ credit ratings 
were downgraded, they were no longer able to take on new 
 
37 See PHIL OLIFF, CHRIS MAI & VINCENT PALACIOS, CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT (2012), 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf [http://perma.cc/F3R7-SUP9] 
(discussing state budget shortfalls). 
38 See LUCY DADAYAN & DONALD J. BOYD, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 
INST. OF GOV’T, STATE REVENUE REPORT: STATE TAX REVENUES GAINED NEW 
STRENGTH IN FOURTH QUARTER 20 (2011), http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/ 
government_finance/state_revenue_report/2011-02-01-SRR_82.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/C23T-NJAH] (“Elements driving this still cloudy outlook include 
expiration of federal stimulus money and expenditure trendlines that 
would produce increases beyond the level of available revenues. States will 
continue to search for ways to climb out of a very deep hole.”); Damian 
Paletta & Matt Phillips, S&P Strips U.S. of Top Credit Rating, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 7, 2011, at A1 (“Recent demographic and economic changes, in 
particular the aging population and ballooning health-care costs, have 
made the long-term U.S. picture an ugly one . . . .”). 
39 Monoline insurance is a type of insurance that protects against the 
risk that a bond or other security will default. If a bond is “wrapped,” or 
covered by high-quality monoline insurance, the issuer gets the benefit of 
a “top-notch” credit rating. Gillian Tett, How Monoline Market Works, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4465d6c8-93e5-11dc-acd0-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3r8gbgdmV [http://perma.cc/ZSZ5-S5GV]. 
40 See WELLS FARGO FUNDS MGMT., LLC, DETERIORATION OF MONOLINE 
INSURANCE COMPANIES AND THE REPERCUSSIONS FOR MUNICIPAL BONDS 3 
(2008). 
41 See id. at 6. 
42 See id. 
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business. By 2010, monoline insurance covered only seven 
percent of municipal bonds.43 
Despite the downfall of monoline insurers and heightened 
concerns about the finances of municipalities, the track 
record of municipal bonds remains stellar, particularly in 
comparison to corporate bonds, and municipal bond credit 
ratings remain high independent of monoline insurance 
availability.44 Historically, municipal bonds have had 
significantly lower rates of default than corporate bonds and 
foreign government bonds—municipal bonds rated 
“Baa/BBB” or higher all have lower default rates than 
“Aaa/AAA”45 rated corporate bonds.46 The Moody’s ten-year 
average cumulative default rate was 0.1032% from 1970 to 
 
43 See Ambac’s Fall: And Then There Was One, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 
4, 2010) http://www.economist.com/node/17420088 [http://perma.cc/DV5E-
EQUW]. 
44 See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at 22–26. 
45 Gradations of creditworthiness are indicated by rating symbols, 
with each symbol representing a group in which the credit characteristics 
are broadly the same. Standard & Poor’s uses a scale whereby the rating 
“AAA” represents the highest available credit rating, and Moody’s uses a 
scale whereby the rating “Aaa” represents the highest available credit 
rating. The ratings “AAA” and “Aaa” are given to issuers with extremely 
strong capacity to meet their financial commitments. The rating “BBB” 
under the Standard & Poor’s scale and the rating “Baa” under the Moody’s 
scale roughly represent similar credit ratings; these ratings are assigned 
to issuers with adequate capacity to meet their financial commitments. 
See Standard & Poor’s Ratings Definitions, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS 
SERVICES (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/ 
web/guest/article/-/view/sourceId/504352 [https://perma.cc/H4ZS-ZFUR]; 
MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, RATING SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS 5 (Feb. 
2016), https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?doc 
id=PBC_79004 [https://perma.cc/B4G7-XB7J]. See also Long-term Rating 
Scales Comparison, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qisrating.htm [http://perma.cc/3PPC-24WU]. 
46  See MOODY’S PUB. FIN. CREDIT COMM., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, 
THE U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND RATING SCALE: MAPPING TO THE GLOBAL RATING 
SCALE AND ASSIGNING GLOBAL SCALE RATINGS TO MUNICIPAL OBLIGATIONS 
6–7 (2007), http://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/102 
249_RM.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNP4-HYM4] [hereinafter MOODY’S GLOBAL 
STUDY]; H.R. REP. NO. 110-835, at 5 (2008) (comparing the cumulative 
historical default rates of municipal and corporate bonds). 
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2006 for the municipal bonds Moody’s rated, compared with 
9.6999% over the same time period for the corporate debt 
Moody’s rated.47 
Further, while some observers are concerned about the 
ability of municipal bond issuers to meet payment 
obligations, particularly in light of mounting pension 
obligations, issuers are unlikely to default on their 
repayment obligations, as repayment obligations currently 
comprise only a small portion of state and local budgets.48 
Given that education, health, and human services costs 
comprise a portion of state and local budgets approximately 
fourteen times larger than that of bond repayment costs, 
municipalities are aware that the downside to restructuring 
debt is much greater than the benefit offered.49  
Even if investors cannot get comfortable with the 
performance of the entire municipal bond market, the track 
record of investment-grade municipal bonds remains 
excellent. While some municipal governments have defaulted 
on their obligations lately, such as Stockton, California and 
Detroit, defaults tend to occur among non-investment grade 
and non-rated bonds, particularly those related to nonprofit 
health-care and housing projects.50 In contrast, defaults are 
rare among investment-grade bonds.51 
 
47 MOODY’S GLOBAL STUDY, supra note 46, at 6–7. 
48 See THALIA MEEHAN, PUTNAM INVESTORS, SEPARATING FACT FROM 
FICTION IN THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET 4 (2011), https://content.putnam. 
com/literature/pdf/II901.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WPS-P28Y] (“To use 
California as an example, in 2009 total debt service payments represented 
less than 5% of total expenditures. In Illinois, debt payments were less 
than 4% of expenses that year. Meanwhile, education and health and 
human services in both states accounted for about 70% of current 
expenses.”). 
49 See id. 
50 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at 24. 
51 See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule on Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards, and Monitoring 8 (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.regulations. 
gov/#!documentDetail;D=OCC-2013-0016-0106. 
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C. What are Tender Option Bonds? 
Prior to a discussion of the Volcker Rule and the Risk 
Retention Rule, it is worth exploring how a TOB works, and 
whether TOBs play a significant enough role in the 
municipal bond market to warrant a discussion on the effects 
of regulating TOBs. 
In a nutshell, TOBs are used as a vehicle to allow money 
market mutual funds to get short-term capital out of longer-
dated mutual bonds, and simultaneously to allow investors 
such as hedge funds to use leverage to invest in more 
municipal bonds.52 TOB transactions typically consist of “the 
deposit of a single issue of highly rated, long-term municipal 
bond in a trust and the issuance by the trust of two classes of 
securities: a floating rate, putable security (the ‘floater’), and 
a residual floating rate security (the ‘residual’).”53 Floaters 
are generally purchased by money market funds, and holders 
of floaters have the right, usually on a daily or weekly basis, 
to put the floaters for purchase at par; this put right is 
supported by a liquidity facility delivered by a highly rated 
provider, typically a bank, and causes the floaters to be a 
short-term security.54 A longer-term investor holds the 
residual, typically a bank, insurance company, mutual fund 
or a hedge fund. The residual investor takes “all of the 
market and structural risk related to the TOB structure,” 
with the floater investors only taking “limited, well-defined 
insolvency and default risks associated with the underlying” 
municipal bonds, the risks of which are “equivalent to those 
associated with investing in such municipal securities 
directly.”55 The trade is leveraged because “when the trust 
issues the floating-rate note, it effectively borrows cash from 
 
52 See Patrick McGee, TOB or Not To Be: Time for a Comeback?, THE 
BOND BUYER, Apr. 19, 2010, at 1. 
53 Am. Securitization Forum, Comment Letter on Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 17 (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www. 
sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-291.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8VR-9C46]. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. 
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the money market funds against the long-term collateral,” 
and allows the investor to “use that cash to finance the 
purchase of more bonds.”56 Those additional purchases are 
“dependent on the cash flow created by the carry trade—the 
spread between the short-term borrowing rate and the bond 
yield—which means the investor has more volume riding on 
the collateral than its original value.”57 The TOB market is 
small relative to the overall market for municipal bonds: the 
TOB market is estimated to be approximately $75 billion in 
size,58 whereas the municipal bond market as a whole is $3.7 
trillion in size.59 The TOB market used to be nearly twice its 
current size, however, before $70 billion in TOBs were 
liquidated in 2008.60 
Despite the size of the TOB market, TOBs are important 
to the proper functioning of the municipal bond market for 
several reasons. Most importantly, TOBs bridge the gap 
between municipalities, which generally issue bonds with 
fixed interest rates and long-term maturities, and money 
market funds, which are looking for high-quality short-term 
debt.61 This has the effect of exerting downward pressure on 
the long end of the municipal yield curve, thereby lowering 
borrowing costs for state and local governments.62 Further, 
TOBs have been popular with large investment firms that 
use debt in “leveraged strategies that aim to boost returns 
 
56 McGee, supra note 52. 
57 Id. 
58 See Comment Letter of Citibank Glob. Mkts. Inc., supra note 4, at 
13 (estimating the size of the TOB market as of 2012). 
59 See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENTS & FRIENDS 
MEMO: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE VOLCKER 
RULE ON MUNICIPAL BONDS (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.cadwalader. 
com/uploads/cfmemos/4ad42d9e6206d57794b11a1b7be0e948.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3GD2-DC5T]. 
60 Daniel Bergstresser, Randolph Cohen & Siddarth Shenai, 
Financial Guarantors and the 2007–2009 Credit Crisis 22 (Harv. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 11-051, 2010). 
61 See McGee, supra note 52. 
62 See id.  
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using borrowed money.”63 Finally, because the municipal 
bonds underlying TOBs are “typically traded in the 
secondary market, any impact on their market values will 
affect all holders of municipal bonds, from individuals to 
institutional investors.”64 Thus, despite the fact that TOBs 
occupy a small part of the overall municipal bond market, 
they create additional demand for municipal bonds and allow 
investors to obtain short-term liquidity they would otherwise 
be unable to obtain. 
TOBs do, however,  carry some dangers, and they helped 
destabilize the municipal bond market in 2008.65 Dissolution 
of TOB programs was wide and rapid, and $70 billion worth 
of TOB programs were liquidated in the crisis.66 Such “rapid 
deleveraging has been identified as a cause of dislocations in 
the market for municipal debt.”67 The situation further 
deteriorated when the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
caused short-term rates to skyrocket, creating a yield 
inversion phenomenon.68 As noted earlier, since investors 
rely on the carry trade for profitability, yield inversion 
 
63 Al Yoon, Andrew R. Johnson & Michael Rapoport, Volcker Rule 
Shows Its Wide Reach, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2013, 7:23 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023041737045792626342875
34164 [http://perma.cc/TF6N-A55H]. 
64 Inv. Co. Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Credit Risk 
Retention 7 (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-11/s714 
11-414.pdf [https://perma.cc/BRJ7-6K4Q]. 
65 See McGee, supra note 52 (“‘Most of the problems that came about 
in 2008 were really brought on by very highly leveraged structures on 
fairly weak underlying bonds, and as a result, when things went wrong, 
there was not enough liquidity to unwind those vehicles, and that’s why 
you saw plummeting prices,’ a Wall Street banker said recently.”). 
66 See Bergstresser, Cohen & Shenai, supra note 60, at 22. 
67 Id. 
68 See McGee, supra note 52; see generally Bergstresser, Cohen & 
Shenai, supra note 60 (exploring a number of potential causes for the yield 
inversion phenomenon in municipal bonds). Yield inversion occurs when 
interest rates on conventionally less attractive debt (such as shorter-dated 
or uninsured debt) are higher than rates on conventionally more attractive 
debt (such as longer-dated or insured debt) and was a major ingredient in 
causing the disruptions in the municipal bond market during the 2008 
financial crisis. 
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meant that TOBs were no longer profitable for investors, and 
investors took huge losses.69 
III. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VARIOUS POST-
FINANCIAL CRISIS PROVISIONS WITH AN 
INFLUENCE ON FUNDING COSTS FOR 
MUNICIPALITIES 
A. The LCR and HQLA Requirement 
The LCR was initially developed in response to the 2008 
financial crisis, and stipulates that large banks must hold 
enough cash-like assets—i.e., HQLAs—to meet their 
obligations for thirty days in a liquidity stress test scenario.70 
Since a key trigger of the 2008 financial crisis was the initial 
“liquidity crunch,” when many banks had adequate capital 
levels but struggled to meet obligations because they lacked 
short-term liquidity,71 regulators’ strategy to develop a more 
resilient banking sector focused on promoting short-term 
liquidity.72 The LCR, modeled after Basel III, a global, 
voluntary regulatory framework for banks, stipulates that 
banking organizations with greater than $250 billion in total 
consolidated assets are subject to the LCR and HQLA 
requirements; bank holding companies with total 
consolidated assets between $50 billion and $250 billion are 
subject to less stringent rules.73 Banks in both asset ranges 
 
69 See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also McGee, supra 
note 52. 
70 BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY 
COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS paras. 10–11, 16 
(Jan. 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf [http://perma.cc/BTH5-
6APX]. 
71 See id. at para. 2. 
72 See id. at para. 1. 
73 DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, U.S. BASEL III LIQUIDITY COVERAGE 
RATIO FINAL RULE VISUAL MEMORANDUM 6 (Sept. 23, 2014), http://usbasel3. 
com/docs/Final%20LCR%20Visual%20Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5EP-
EHGN]. 
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must hold enough liquid assets to survive a thirty-day stress 
test.74 
Under the international Basel III standard, there are two 
classes of HQLA-eligible assets—Level 1 and Level 2, with 
Level 2 assets being divided further into Level 2A assets and 
Level 2B assets. Level 1 assets are cash-like assets that can 
comprise an unlimited percentage of the HQLA pool and are 
not subject to haircuts, which are reductions to the asset’s 
market value for the purpose of calculating the asset’s value 
to meet capital requirements.75 Some examples of Level 1 
assets under Basel III include coins, banknotes, and central 
bank reserves.76 Level 2A assets and 2B assets are 
considered less liquid assets that may together comprise up 
to forty percent of a bank’s pool of HQLAs, and are subject to 
haircuts.77 Typical Level 2A assets under Basel III include 
debt guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, or public 
sector entities, subject to certain liquidity requirements, and 
corporate debt with a rating of at least AA-.78 Level 2B assets 
under Basel III include certain residential mortgage-backed 
securities, corporate debt with a rating of between A+ and 
BBB-, and common equity.79 Basel III generally treats 
municipal bonds as Level 2A assets, as they fit within the 
Basel III definition for Level 2A assets of “marketable 
securities representing claims on or guaranteed by 
sovereigns, central banks, public sector entities or 
multilateral development banks.”80 
 
74 See id. at 4. See also Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk 
Measurement Standards, Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,440, 61,520–21 (Oct. 
10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249, 329) (explaining 21-
calendar-day stress test period originally proposed for banks with assets 
between $50 billion and $250 billion and reasons a 30-calendar-day period 
was selected for such banks in the final rule). 
75 See generally DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 73, at 11. 
76 See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 70, at 
para. 50. 
77 See id. at para. 51. 
78 See id. at para. 52. 
79 See id. at para. 54. 
80 See id. at para. 52. 
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While the American LCR is similar to those promulgated 
under Basel III, there are key differences between the Basel 
III framework and the LCR.81 For the purposes of this Note, 
the key differences relate to the mix of assets that may 
satisfy the HQLA requirement.82 In September 2014, when 
the Fed unanimously agreed to a new liquidity rule requiring 
thirty of the nation’s largest banks to hold a combined $100 
billion more in cash or cash-like assets, municipal bonds 
were excluded from HQLA status.83 What is notable is the 
treatment of municipal bonds in contrast to financial 
instruments that are comparable: corporate debt securities 
may qualify as Level 2B assets.84 Further, bonds issued by 
GSEs (“GSE bonds”) are classified as Level 2A assets.85 
 
81 See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, supra note 73, at 14. 
82 See Tracy, supra note 13. 
83 See id. 
84 12 C.F.R. § 50.20(c)(1) (2015); 12 C.F.R. § 249.20(c)(1) (2015); 12 
C.F.R. § 329.20(c)(1) (2015). Corporate bonds are considered Level 2B 
assets if they are:  
(i) Investment grade under 12 CFR part 1 as of the 
calculation date; (ii) Issued or guaranteed by an entity 
whose obligations have a proven record as a reliable source 
of liquidity in repurchase or sales markets during stressed 
market conditions, as demonstrated by: (A) The market 
price of the corporate debt security or equivalent securities 
of the issuer declining by no more than 20 percent during a 
30 calendar-day period of significant stress, or (B) The 
market haircut demanded by counterparties to secured 
lending and secured funding transactions that are 
collateralized by the corporate debt security or equivalent 
securities of the issuer increasing by no more than 20 
percentage points during a 30 calendar-day period of 
significant stress; and (iii) Not an obligation of a financial 
sector entity and not an obligation of a consolidated 
subsidiary of a financial sector entity. 
Id. 
85 12 C.F.R. § 50.20(b)(1) (2015); 12 C.F.R. § 249.20(b)(1) (2015); 12 
C.F.R. § 329.20(b)(1) (2015).  
An asset is a level 2A liquid asset if the asset is liquid and 
readily-marketable and is . . . [a] security issued by, or 
guaranteed as to the timely payment of principal and 
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The exclusion of municipal bonds has triggered a wave of 
commentary from academics, regulators, politicians, and the 
financial services industry. Supporters of the exclusion of 
municipal bonds from HQLA designation contend that 
municipal bonds have low trading activity, and that the 
corresponding lack of liquidity and the inability to monetize 
municipal bonds quickly justify their exclusion.86 However, 
critics, including Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), highlighted 
the size and scope of the municipal bond market in fighting 
for its inclusion.87 In response, Federal Reserve Board 
Governor Daniel Tarullo left the door open for municipal 
bonds to become HQLA-eligible,88 and in early 2015, the Fed 
proposed a rule that would amend the LCR requirement so 
that municipal bonds would be treated as Level 2B liquid 
assets for the LCR.89 However, those lobbying for more 
favorable treatment of municipal bonds could not consider 
 
interest by, a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise, that 
is investment grade under 12 CFR part 1 as of the 
calculation date, provided that the claim is senior to 
preferred stock. 
Id. 
86 See Stephen J. Lubben, When Debt Markets Don’t Really Act as 
Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes. 
com/2014/10/01/when-debt-markets-dont-really-act-as-markets [http:// 
perma.cc/2EPM-GHN7]; Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk 
Measurement Standards, Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,440, 61,444, 61,462 
(Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249, 329). 
87 See Letter from Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senator, to Daniel 
Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., Thomas 
J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, and Martin J. Gruenburg, 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.fdic. 
gov/regulations/laws/federal/2013/2013-liquidity_coverage_ae04-c_97.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N6ZD-ACJ9]. 
88 See Tracy, supra note 13 (“Mr. Tarullo said staff would reconsider 
[the treatment of municipal debt securities] in the future and ‘develop 
some criteria for determining which such bonds fall into [the HQLA] 
category and thus might be considered for inclusion’ as a high-quality 
liquid asset.”). 
89 See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Treatment of U.S. Municipal 
Securities as High-Quality Liquid Assets, 80 Fed. Reg. 30,383, 30,385 
(proposed May 28, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 249). 
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the Fed proposed rule a victory. Under the proposal, Level 
2B assets could not account for more than fifteen percent of 
the total HQLA amount, and the Fed would also cap the 
amount of HQLAs that an institution could hold via 
municipal bonds at five percent.90 More importantly, the 
OCC and the FDIC did not follow suit in proposing a similar 
position as the Fed.91 The OCC indicated that it is not 
convinced that municipal bonds can be easily traded, while 
the FDIC’s position remains unclear.92 As the primary 
regulator for many large institutions capable of impacting 
market liquidity, the OCC’s lack of willingness to change its 
LCR requirements is concerning. Of the top nine holders of 
municipal bonds in the country, seven are regulated by the 
OCC, although the Bank of New York Mellon and State 
Street Bank & Trust are notable exceptions.93 Lawmakers 
have attempted to take matters into their own hands; a 
bipartisan coalition of members of the House Financial 
Services Committee, led by Rep. Luke Messer (R-Ind.), have 
proposed H.R. 2209, which would require that the LCR rule 
treat investment grade municipal bonds actively traded in 
the secondary market as Level 2A assets, the same tier as 
claims on GSEs.94 
B. The Volcker Rule 
The Volcker Rule, enacted in Section 619 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, added Section 13 to the Bank Holding Company 
Act, which regulates the actions of bank holding companies.95 
 
90 See id. at 30,387. 
91 See Ackerman & McGrane, supra note 15 (“The other two 
regulators, the [OCC] and the [FDIC], currently don’t plan to follow the 
Fed, people with knowledge of those agencies said.”). 
92 See id. 
93 See Kyle Glazier, Fed: Muni HQLA Gets a Proposal, THE BOND 
BUYER, May 22, 2015, at 1, 3; Ackerman & McGrane, supra note 15. 
94 H.R. 2209, 114th Cong. (2015) (“To require the appropriate Federal 
banking agencies to treat certain municipal obligations as level 2A liquid 
assets, and for other purposes.”). 
95 See Hearing on the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Municipal 
Finance: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t 
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The Volcker Rule has two primary objectives: preventing 
banks from engaging in proprietary trading in certain 
classes of securities, and preventing banks from making 
certain risky investments in those hedge funds and private 
equity funds defined under the rule as “covered funds.”96 
There were concerns based on regulators’ proposed 
regulation that financial institutions subject to the Volcker 
Rule would have to (a) suspend secondary trading in at least 
some category of municipal bonds and (b) refrain from 
acquiring or retaining an ownership interest, or sponsoring 
TOBs.97 The former concern was resolved in favor of 
financial institutions and municipalities, as all municipal 
bonds are eligible for proprietary trading under the final 
Volcker Rule.98 This Note focuses on why the latter should be 
 
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 71 (2012) 
(Statement of Kenneth Gibbs, Member, Board of Directors and Chair, 
Municipal Securities Division, Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association). 
96 See HICKS, supra note 1, at 2; see Prohibitions and Restrictions on 
Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5668 (Jan. 31, 
2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255) 
(describing the statutory Volcker Rule codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). 
97 See generally NUVEEN ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC, THE VOLCKER 
RULE AND THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET 1 (Jan. 2014). 
98 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. at 5644–46. The initial proposed rule 
exempted municipal bonds issued by state and local governments from 
proprietary trading restrictions, but it did not exempt those issued by an 
agency of state and local governments. Commenters noted that the 
proposed rule would bifurcate the municipal bond market without a 
meaningful improvement in the soundness of banking entities. Id. at 5645. 
Many states and municipalities rely on securities issued by agencies and 
instrumentalities to fund “essential activities, including utility systems, 
infrastructure projects, affordable housing, hospitals, universities, and 
other nonprofit institutions.” Id. at 5646. “Exempting obligations issued by 
state and municipal agencies and instrumentalities in the same manner as 
the direct obligations of states and municipalities lessens potential 
inconsistent treatment of government obligations across states and 
municipalities that use different funding methods for government 
projects.” Id. Regulators found these arguments persuasive over concerns 
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resolved in favor of financial institutions and municipalities 
as well. 
1. The Volcker Rule and Tender Option Bonds 
With respect to the “covered funds” requirement, the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(“SIFMA”), an American trade group representing securities 
firms, banks, and asset managers, and individual firms in 
the industry have been largely unsuccessful at favorably 
influencing regulators’ interpretation of the Volcker Rule. 
The final rule implementing the Volcker Rule prohibits any 
banking entity, as a principal, from acquiring or retaining an 
ownership interest or sponsoring a “covered fund,”99 which is 
defined to include any issuer that would be an “investment 
company,” as defined in the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (the “1940 Act”), “but for Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7)” of the 
1940 Act.100 The definition of “covered fund” generally covers 
high-risk entities such as private equity funds and hedge 
 
that bonds issued by agencies and instrumentalities of states or 
municipalities pose risks to the banking system because the market for 
these bonds has not been properly regulated or controlled, as regulators 
decided that both bonds issued by municipalities and agents of 
municipalities are ultimately the obligation of the municipality. Id. 
Ultimately, whether the municipality issues the obligation directly or by 
an agent reflects only a difference in funding source. 
99 17 C.F.R. § 255.10(a) (2015). 
100 17 C.F.R. § 255.10(b)(i) (2015). See also SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 
LLP, VOLCKER RULE: U.S. AGENCIES APPROVE FINAL VOLCKER RULE, 
DETAILING PROHIBITIONS AND COMPLIANCE REGIMES APPLICABLE TO BANKING 
ENTITIES WORLDWIDE 62–63 (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.sullcrom.com/ 
siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Volcker_Rule.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
7CS7-5KMQ] [hereinafter SULLIVAN & CROMWELL] (“[A]s a threshold 
matter, a company may be an investment company if it issues or proposes 
to issue any security and ‘is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, 
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, 
or trading in securities’ or ‘is engaged or proposes to engage in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in 
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a 
value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such issuer’s total assets 
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated 
basis.’”). 
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funds.101 Unfortunately for banks, municipalities, and 
borrowers, TOB vehicles are included within the definition of 
a “covered fund.”102 Moreover, to the extent that a banking 
entity is serving as the sponsor, investment adviser, or 
investment manager to a TOB vehicle, the Volcker Rule 
would prohibit the banking entity or its affiliates from 
entering into certain “covered transactions” with the TOB 
vehicle, including providing liquidity facilities and credit 
enhancement.103 This created fears that the Volcker Rule 
would limit the market for TOBs, since banks would have to 
cease participating in the TOB market.104 
A number of commenters called for the exclusion of TOB 
vehicles from the definition of a “covered fund” because 
TOBs are similar to repurchase agreements, which the 
Volcker Rule excludes.105 Nevertheless, TOB vehicles were 
not exempted from the definition of “covered fund” in the 
final version of the Volcker Rule.106 Regulators cited the fact 
that while the Volcker Rule does not apply to municipal 
 
101 See id. at 60. (Some commenters on the Proposed Rule suggested 
that Agencies attempt to provide qualitative, characteristics-based 
definitions of “hedge fund” and “private equity fund,” so as not to capture 
those vehicles that are not part of an investment fund management 
business. 
102 See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, RISK RETENTION 




103 See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, supra note 59. 
104 See Farmer, supra note 19 (“There ‘may be an increase in 
financing costs to municipalities as a result of a decrease in demand for 
the types of municipal securities’ typically financed with TOBs, the rule 
says. Without this financing mechanism, some municipalities may have to 
offer higher interest rates in order to sell their bonds.”). 
105 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5702 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
106 See id. 
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bonds, TOBs are more similar to bond repackaging 
securitizations, which are not excludable under the rule.107 
C. Risk Retention Provisions 
Finally, the Risk Retention Rule influences the municipal 
bond market by requiring issuers of TOBs to retain some of 
the risk on the TOBs.108 The risk retention provisions in 
Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act are applicable to asset-
backed securities (“ABSs”) such as TOBs. The Risk Retention 
Rule, otherwise known as the “skin-in-the-game” 
requirement, is expected to impose significant costs and 
obligations on issuers subject to it.109 Commenters lobbied for 
the exclusion of TOBs from the definition of an ABS, thus 
sparing them from the Risk Retention Rule,110 but regulators 
refused to grant a full exemption.111 
In a nutshell, Section 941 and its implementing 
regulation stipulate that a “sponsor” of an ABS transaction 
retain some of the credit risk of the securitized assets in one 
of several permitted forms. The “sponsor” is an entity that 
“organizes and initiates a securitization transaction by 
selling or transferring assets, either directly or indirectly, to 
the issuing vehicle.”112 Sponsors must retain at least five 
percent of the credit risk of the assets collateralizing the 
ABSs that they bundle and sell as securities on their books 
to align the interests of participants in the securitization 
 
107 See id. at 5702–03. 
108 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2012). 
109 See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CLIENT PUBLICATION, CREDIT RISK 
RETENTION RULES FINALIZED 1 (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.shearman.com 
/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2014/10/Credit-Risk-Retention-
Rules-Finalized-DSP-102314.pdf [http://perma.cc/MZ5V-59HK]. 
110 See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on 
Credit Risk Retention 6–8 (July 15, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
s7-14-11/s71411-580.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAZ3-HSC3]. 
111 See Gorman, supra note 22 (describing regulators’ refusal to grant 
a full exemption for TOBs before discussing other TOB-related changes 
regulators made in the final risk retention rule in response to industry 
comments on the proposed rule). 
112 See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 109, at 2. 
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process.113 This can be done in several ways: the risk can (i) 
be a “horizontal interest” in the “first-loss” tranche of an ABS 
structure equal to five percent of the fair value of all ABS 
interests in the issuing entity, (ii) be a “vertical interest” 
consisting of five percent of the value of each tranche, or (iii) 
be a combination of the two.114 The specific mechanics of the 
required risk retention methods are beyond the scope of this 
Note, but the key point is that traditional risk retention 
methods applicable to most ABS interests do not work for 
TOBs, since they do not preserve the tax-exempt structure of 
TOBs.115 Rule-makers allowed for a “qualified tender option 
bond entity” (“QTOB”) to meet the Risk Retention Rule 
through an alternate method that preserves the tax-
advantaged structure.116 A TOB must qualify as a QTOB to 
take advantage of the alternate risk retention measures. The 
result is that, as a practical matter, TOBs that do not meet 
the definition of a QTOB are not issuable, as they are 
required to meet the broadly applicable risk retention 
requirements that fail to preserve TOBs’ tax-advantaged 
status. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE POST-
FINANCIAL CRISIS REGULATIONS ON 
MUNICIPAL BONDS MEANINGFULLY 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOUNDNESS OF THE 
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
This section examines whether post-financial crisis 
rulemaking on municipal bonds will have a meaningful 
impact in creating a sounder financial system, or if the 
regulations have made it more difficult for municipalities to 
 
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(b)–(c)(1) (2012); Credit Risk Retention, 79 
Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,603–04 (Dec. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 
43, 244, 373, 1234, 17 C.F.R. pt. 246, 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
114 See HICKS, supra note 1, at 2. 
115 See Gorman, supra note 22. 
116 See David M. Lynn, A Closer Look at US Credit Risk Retention 
Rules, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 16, 2014, 
9:00 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/11/16/a-closer-look-at-
us-credit-risk-retention-rules/ [http://perma.cc/YK7W-R7YM]. 
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raise capital without a meaningful improvement in the 
soundness of the financial system. This Note contends that 
post-financial crisis rulemaking raises financing costs for 
municipalities without a meaningful improvement in the 
safety of the financial system. 
A. The Exclusion of Municipal Bonds from the HQLA 
Framework Does Not Make Sense, as Riskier Asset 
Classes Are HQLA-Eligible. 
The current exclusion of municipal bonds from HQLA 
eligibility will increase lending costs for municipalities 
without meaningfully contributing to the safety of the 
financial system. Regulators have declined to classify 
municipal bonds as HQLAs,117 and they have expressed 
further concerns that the funding of municipal bonds is 
limited in the repurchase market, making municipal bonds 
difficult to monetize.118 Regulators acknowledged criticisms 
that credit quality, default rates, and central bank eligibility 
all point to the inclusion of municipal bonds as HQLAs, 
particularly in light of the fact that corporate debt and 
sovereign debt issued by companies or countries that have 
experienced financial troubles can count towards a bank’s 
HQLA requirement.119 While the credit risk of a security 
may be an important factor, regulators noted that it is 
merely one factor for consideration along with trading 
volume and the presence of deep, active sale or repurchase 
markets.120 Regulators also highlighted that the treatment of 
municipal bonds is consistent with other asset classes that 
“significantly vary in trading volume and lack access to deep 
and active repurchase markets,” such as covered bonds and 
 
117 See 12 C.F.R. § 249.20 (2015); 12 C.F.R. § 329.20 (2015); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 50.20 (2015). 
118 Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 
Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,440, 61,463 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 249, 329). 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
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ABS.121 Finally, regulators stated their belief that the 
exclusion of municipal bonds will have minimal effect, as 
banks will continue to invest in municipals for their yield, 
credit quality, and other factors.122 Since regulators have 
focused on the availability of “deep, active sale or repurchase 
markets,” the following analysis focuses on this aspect of 
municipal bonds in order to dispense with the regulators’ 
aforementioned concerns.123 
First, in terms of trading volume, municipal bonds 
compare favorably to corporate bonds. At first glance, it 
appears that there is a more robust market for corporate 
bonds. In 2012, trading volume in municipal bonds averaged 
$11.3 billion, as opposed to $22.6 billion for corporate 
bonds.124 However, taken as a percentage of the entire 
market, 0.31% of total outstanding municipal bonds traded 
in 2012, as opposed to 0.25% for corporate bonds, suggesting 
that turnover in municipal bond ownership is actually higher 
than for corporate bonds.125 In addition, “trading volume in 
the municipal market, while subject to some seasonality and 
variation based on issuance activity and other factors, 
remains fairly constant within a range.”126 Wells Fargo noted 
in a comment letter to the Fed that municipal bond prices 
experience less volatility than U.S. Treasuries.127 
Further, regulators noted that the ability to easily value a 
security is important to assessing the liquidity of an asset.128 
 
121 Id. 
122 See id. at 61,464. 
123 Id. at 61,463. 
124 Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, supra note 51, at 3. 
125 Id. at 3. 
126 Id. at 4. 
127 See Wells Fargo & Co., Comment Letter on Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring 17 (Jan. 
31, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/January/20140131/ 
R-1466/R-1466_013114_111898_491608851579_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/SM 
U4-78KT]. 
128 Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., Comment Letter on Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring 
12 (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/May/2014 
MIKI – FINAL  
No. 1:252] LIVE AND LET DIE 279 
Valuing municipal bonds is easier than regulators suggest 
thanks to the availability of three non-bank service 
providers: Standard & Poor’s Securities Evaluations, 
Interactive Data Corporation, and Bloomberg Asset 
Valuation.129 Because prices are provided by third-party 
rating agencies, there is transparency in the rating process, 
and the prices provided have a high degree of accuracy.130 In 
a comment letter, Nuveen Asset Management contended 
that as of November 29, 2013, the market-value weighted 
average difference, in absolute terms, between the prices 
provided by Standard & Poor’s and Interactive Data 
Corporation on close to 14,000 municipal bonds with a total 
market value in excess of $56 billion was only 1.22%, a figure 
which declined to just 0.92% when the universe was 
narrowed to investment grade securities only.131 The 
municipal bond market views similarly structured municipal 
bonds—i.e. those that have similar coupons and maturities—
as being substitutable, so the price of a municipal bond may 
be ascertained even if the individual security does not trade 
on a daily basis.132 Additionally, the municipal market is one 
with many broker-dealers that provide market-making 
functions. The MSRB, as of January 15, 2014, regulated 
1664 registered broker-dealers.133 
Finally, municipal bonds have historically been treated 
similarly to treasury bonds and GSE securities, in that all 
three asset classes have been subject to less onerous laws 
and regulations that “impose fewer restrictions on, and allow 
for more advantageous terms when, lending cash against 




129 See id. 
130 See id. 
131 See id. (citing Nuveen Asset Management, LLC, Comment Letter 
on Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and 
Monitoring 6 (Jan. 30, 2014)). 
132 See Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 127, at 18. 
133 See id. at 19. 
134 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., supra note 128, at 2, 14. 
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securities should be treated similarly under the LCR as well. 
When municipal bonds are posted as collateral to a Federal 
Reserve Bank, they are accepted at very high advance 
rates—the same rate as AAA-rated dollar denominated 
foreign sovereign bonds and U.S. GSE securities, which are 
treated as Level 1 and Level 2A liquid assets, respectively.135 
State finance laws in the United States also “create a well of 
advantageous funding for securities deemed to be of 
sufficiently high credit and liquidity value,” such as treasury 
bonds, GSE securities, and municipal bonds.136 
As outlined in the last several paragraphs, there are 
compelling reasons to include municipal bonds as HQLAs, 
though there is a debate as to just how much of a 
quantifiable impact would be felt. Regulators rightly pointed 
out that many banks subject to the LCR requirements “did 
not include municipal bonds in their holdings of liquid assets 
for contingent liquidity stress purposes prior to the LCR, yet 
continued to invest in municipal bonds.”137 Furthermore, the 
largest banks have already prepared for the non-inclusion of 
municipal bonds, meaning that much of the adjustments 
have already been made by banks.138 
However, there is market data suggesting that the 
exclusion of municipal bonds from the HQLA framework has 
already had an effect on the market for municipal bonds.139 
As of the end of October 2014, the daily amount of municipal 
bond transactions had fallen to three billion dollars from four 
 
135 See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, supra note 51, at 7. 
136 See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., supra note 128, at 14. 
137 See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement 
Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 61,440, 61,464 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 249, 349). 
138 See Brian Jacobsen, Municipal Bonds and Liquidity Coverage 
Ratios, WELLS FARGO ASSET MGMT.: ADVANTAGEVOICE BLOG (Sept. 4, 2014), 
https://blogs.wellsfargo.com/advantagevoice/2014/09/municipal-bonds-and-
liquidity-coverage-ratios [http://perma.cc/W6HC-8XYE]. 
139 See generally Simon Colvin, Muni Bonds Lose Out in Fed 
Reshuffle, MARKIT (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.markit.com/Commentary/ 
Get/28102014-Equities-Muni-bonds-lose-out-in-Fed-reshuffle 
[http://perma.cc/ZL5V-KE6A]. 
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billion dollars in the beginning of September 2014.140 
Furthermore, at the start of 2014, the weighted average 
“haircut” for municipal bond collateral—i.e., the amount of 
extra collateral required to be posted against a loan—was 
1.5%.141 That number climbed to 2.5% by October 2014, 
suggesting the weakness of the asset class.142 The negative 
effects from the HQLA omission could have a 
disproportionate effect on small issuers—those without good 
market access.143 For instance, Utah-based Zions National 
Bank holds $558 million in held-to-maturity municipal bonds 
and an additional $66 million in the available-for-sale 
category.144 Zions has said that it would have to unload some 
of these municipal bonds; previously, banks were happy to 
support the local economy by buying municipal bonds from 
municipalities with limited funding to access, but now banks 
may be disincentivized from doing so, leading to higher 
financing costs.145 
For the reasons raised above, excluding municipal bonds 
from the definition of HQLAs when corporate bonds are 
included is inconsistent. The factors mentioned above 
demonstrate that the municipal bond market is more liquid 
than regulators suggest, and that municipal bonds hold up 
relatively well during times of crisis as compared to HQLA-
eligible corporate bonds. 
B. The Non-Exclusion of TOBs from the Volcker Rule 
Will Raise Financing Costs for Municipalities 
Without Making the Financial System Safer. 
The Volcker Rule’s overbroad “covered fund” definition 
limits the ability of banks to participate in TOB programs, 
hurting state and local government borrowers who 
 
140 See id. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See generally Joe Rennison, US Muni Treasurers Warn LCR Could 
Crimp Spending, RISK MAGAZINE (May 28, 2014). 
144 See id. 
145 See id. 
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potentially stand to lose an important alternate source of 
demand for their securities, and increasing the costs of 
raising capital for municipalities. Furthermore, money 
market mutual funds and their shareholders will lose an 
important source of low-risk, high-quality investments. 
TOBs are actually safer than municipal bonds themselves, 
since TOBs are supported by liquidity facilities from 
banks.146 
Rule-makers have provided specific exclusions from the 
Volcker Rule for securities that they interpret as falling 
within the rule of construction contained in Section 13(g)(2) 
of the Bank Holding Company Act, including exclusions for 
the sale and securitization of loans and for securities that do 
not function as investment funds.147 However, since TOBs 
have municipal bonds, not loans, as underlying assets, 
regulators declined to exempt TOBs from proprietary trading 
restrictions.148 The exemption was not given with the belief 
that the re-securitization of municipal debt should not be 
treated any differently from the re-securitization of other 
debt instruments, other than loans.149 Regulators recognized 
the potential increase in financing costs as a result of 
reduction in demand for the types of municipal bonds 
involved in TOBs, but declined to extend the Volcker Rule 
exemption to TOBs and are adhering to the language of the 
rule.150 
From a practical standpoint, TOBs serve an important 
role by providing the equivalent of “repo financing” with 
municipal bonds.151 In other words, TOBs are a way of 
obtaining short-term financing while maintaining the tax-
free nature of interest in municipal bonds, since TOBs are 
 
146 See Hearing, supra note 95, at 73 (statement of Kenneth Gibbs). 
147 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5702 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. at 5703. 
151 CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, supra note 59, at 11. 
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treated as trusts, which for tax purposes is treated as a pass-
through entity.152 Without TOBs, it will be more difficult for 
investors to invest in municipal bonds on a short-term basis. 
From a practical standpoint, TOBs are essentially 
repurchase agreements,153 and repurchase agreements are 
not subject to Volcker Rule regulations at all because they 
“do not appear to be of the type the statutory definition of 
trading account was designed to cover.”154  
The non-exclusion of TOBs from Volcker Rule 
requirements would send undesirable side effects outside of 
the municipal bond market as well. Money market funds 
would also suffer as a result of the Volcker Rule’s application 
to TOBs. TOBs are important to money market funds 
because they are often eligible under Rule 2a-7 of the 
Investment Company Act for investment by money market 
mutual funds,155 which are required by law to invest in low-
risk securities.156 However, in order for money market funds 
to invest in municipal bonds, the maturity mismatch 
between municipal bonds, which are generally issued with 
fixed interest rates and long-term maturities to enable state 
and local governments to manage their borrowing costs, and 
the demands of money market funds, which are only allowed 
to invest in short-term debt per the Investment Company 
 
152 See id. at 11–12. 
153 See id. at 16–17. 
154 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private 
Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5553 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255); see also Prohibitions and 
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 
68,846, 68,850 (proposed Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 44, 
248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255); ) (proposing to exclude repurchase agreements 
because they “do not appear to involve the requisite short-term trading 
intent”). 
155 See Hearing, supra note 95, at 73 (statement of Kenneth Gibbs). 
156 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2015); see also Fast Answers: Money 
Market Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
mfmmkt.htm [http://perma.cc/Q43V-MJHP]. 
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Act, must be solved.157 This maturity mismatch is relieved by 
TOBs.158 TOB floaters make up over twenty percent of tax-
exempt money market fund holdings in some money market 
funds,159 and given that the 2a-7 criteria for what qualifies 
for deposit into a money market fund have gotten tighter, 
TOBs are as important as ever as a source of safe, short-term 
funding.160 Money market funds have represented a large 
source of demand for municipal bonds, but assets in money 
market funds have already shrunk to $257.4 billion from a 
peak of $483.8 billion because of the shrinking pool of 
investments eligible for purchase by TOBs.161 The non-
exclusion of TOBs would further exacerbate this trend.162 
In response, banks have come up with creative TOB 
structures that can sidestep the Volcker Rule. The preamble 
to the Volcker Rule seems to implicitly suggest that if banks 
can figure out a way that a TOB will not qualify as a covered 
fund, then regulators would take no issue with it: 
The final rule, however, does not prevent a banking 
entity from owning or otherwise participating in a 
tender option bond vehicle; it requires that these 
activities be conducted in the same manner as with 
other covered funds. In this regard, under the final 
rule, a banking entity would need to evaluate 
whether a tender option bond vehicle is a covered 
fund as defined in the final rule. If a tender option 
bond vehicle is a covered fund and an exclusion from 
that definition is not available, then banking entities 
sponsoring such a vehicle will be subject to the 
 
157 See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, supra note 59, at 11. 
158 See id. 
159 See Yoon et al., supra note 63. 
160 See generally Investor Insights: SEC Rule 2a-7 Guidelines, 
MORGAN STANLEY (2013), http://www.morganstanley.com/im/emailers/ 
media/pdf/liq_sol_updt_012013_rule_2a-7.pdf [http://perma.cc/YT2D-
MZYE]. 
161 See Yoon et al., supra note 63. 
162 Id. 
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prohibitions in § __.14 of the final rule and the 
provisions of section 13(f) of the BHC Act.163 
There are two alternatives: restructuring the TOB as a joint 
venture, or restructuring the TOB so that the banking entity 
would participate as an unaffiliated third party.164 
Under a joint venture structure, the municipal bonds are 
held in a TOB trust, rather than in a traditional TOB 
structure where the bank would act as the issuer of the TOB 
trust.165 The bank would sell the municipal bonds into the 
TOB trust, which is a joint venture between the banks and 
the investors.166 So long as the joint venture does not consist 
of more than ten parties, the TOB is exempted from 
registration under the 1940 Act.167 Regulators have 
specifically noted that to the extent that one of the included 
entities qualifies for one or more of the other exclusions from 
the definition of a covered fund, that entity would not be 
considered a covered fund.168 Otherwise, the joint venture 
structure is essentially a relabeling of the existing TOB 
structure.169 Regulators may be loath to allow for a 
 
163 Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain 
Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity 
Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5703 (Jan. 31, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pts. 44, 248, 351, 17 C.F.R. pt. 255). 
164 See KAREN FITZGERALD, STANDARD & POOR’S RATINGS SERVICES, 
TENDER OPTION BONDS AND THE VOLCKER RULE 4, 5 (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://cdn.bondbuyer.com/media/pdfs/BBrandeis14-Fitzgerald.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/47TM-FCZS]. 
165 See Cate Long, Moody’s Rates First TOB That Passes Volcker Rule, 
REUTERS (June 13, 2014, 9:15 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/ 
2014/06/13/moodys-rates-first-tob-that-passes-volcker-rule/ 
[http://perma.cc/4C3F-CX6E]. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See Letter from David L. Cohen, Managing Dir. & Assoc. Gen. 
Counsel, Mun. Sec. Div., and Matthew J. Nevins, Managing Dir. & Assoc. 
Gen. Counsel, Asset Mgmt. Grp., Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to Scott 
Alvarez, Gen. Counsel, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., et al. 3 
(June 13, 2014) (on file with the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 
169 See Kyle Glazier, Citi Analyst: Two Options to Save Tender Option 
Bonds, THE BOND BUYER, Apr. 9, 2014, at 3 (describing a report that states 
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relabeling, since it may prompt others to skirt the Volcker 
Rule provisions in a similar manner, and may opt to squash 
the joint venture structure in the future. 
There are unfortunately further problems with the joint 
venture structure. One problem is that sometimes banks 
split either the residual or the holding note into many 
smaller investment funds, and the joint venture structure 
will make it more difficult to do so.170 The TOB must be big 
enough to be “marketable to potential floater holders because 
purchasers of floaters generally have minimum purchase 
requirements to reduce costs and administrative burdens.”171 
In contrast, the unaffiliated third party structure takes 
advantage of the fact that the banking entity, “although it no 
longer would serve as sponsor of the TOB trust, or have an 
ownership interest in the trust, could assume certain 
servicing functions with respect to the trust, consistent with 
the Volcker Rule.”172 This can be accomplished by having the 
banking entity provide credit or liquidity enhancement for a 
TOB program that is not its own, but rather that of a mutual 
fund or a dealer.173 The banking entity could assume certain 
servicing functions with respect to the trust consistent with 
the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on ownership of and certain 
relationships with covered funds.174 However, banks would 
no longer be able to assume certain roles in conjunction with 
the TOB’s operation, such as serving as the trust’s sponsor, 
having an ownership interest in the trust, or providing credit 
enhancement, liquidity or remarketing services to the trust; 
these roles would need to be handled by a non-bank TOB 
residual interest holder.175  
 
that “regulators might view [such joint ventures] as a re-definition of an 
existing structure to skirt the rules”). 
170 See id. 
171 See Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 64, at 10. 
172 See Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 110, at 4. 
173 See Glazier, supra note 169.  
174 See Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 110, at 4 n.10. 
175 See Glazier, supra note 169; see BlackRock, Inc., Comment Letter 
on Proposed Rule on Credit Risk Retention 2 (July 22, 2014), https:// 
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Thus, while adopting this structure would allow for 
business to go on, banks would disfavor this solution as they 
would be precluded from assuming key functions in relation 
to TOBs. The Volcker Rule has forced banks to shut down 
operations that regulators have deemed risky, squeezing the 
banks’ ability to make a profit. Banks should still be able to 
operate the TOB program, as it is not the type of speculative 
activity that the Volcker Rule is aiming to prohibit. 
From a societal point of view, the continued existence of 
TOB programs will not be detrimental to the health of the 
financial system. One concern that was alluded to earlier is 
the fact that TOBs helped cause the destabilization of the 
municipal bond market in 2008. However, Professors Daniel 
Bergstresser, Randolph Cohen, and Siddarth Shenai have 
shown that the deteriorating market for TOBs was not the 
main force that caused the yield inversion phenomenon in 
the municipal bond market, though it may have altered 
pricing for monoline insurance.176 TOB programs post-crisis 
have also operated with less leverage and better collateral.177 
The collapse of monoline insurers has actually enhanced the 
safety of TOB programs, since they are now backed with 
better collateral and cannot rely on the strength of monoline 
insurers.178 
C. The Risk Retention Provisions of the Volcker Rule 
Should be Inapplicable to TOBs Since TOBs are Not 
the Type of Asset that the Risk Retention Rules are 
Meant to Address. 
Additionally, the risk retention provisions of Dodd-Frank 
will impose significant costs and obligations on TOB 
programs,179 and this increase in cost could adversely affect 




176 See Bergstresser, Cohen & Shenai, supra note 60, at 2–3.  
177 See McGee, supra note 52. 
178 See id. 
179 See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, supra note 109. 
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from TOB programs.180 Industry commentators offered a 
number of suggestions, but regulators were generally 
unreceptive.181 As explained below, the current Risk 
Retention Rule provisions relating to TOBs are problematic 
because they increase the cost of issuance for municipalities 
without accurately reflecting market standards, and would 
serve to stifle innovation in the TOB market. 
There is a strong case to be made that TOBs should be 
exempt from the Risk Retention Rule, given that TOBs do 
not raise the dangers that Congress intended to ameliorate 
when it passed Section 15G of the Exchange Act.182 Rule-
makers rationalized their decision not to exempt TOBs by 
stating that “the agencies continue to believe that tender 
options bonds are asset-backed securities under the 
definition in section 15G because they are securities 
collateralized by self-liquidating financial assets and the 
holders of the securities receive payments that depend 
primarily on cash flow from the securitized assets.”183 That 
TOBs are considered ABSs is perhaps driven by a desire to 
simplify and limit exceptions. The desire to simplify can be 
seen in other sections of 15G—for instance, the Risk 
Retention Rule stipulates that the amount of risk that must 
be retained is five percent, regardless of the quality of the 
assets or other similar factors, because doing so would 
unnecessarily complicate the rule.184 Given the density of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, the drive for simplicity is understandable. 
However, several compelling reasons exist to exempt TOB 
from the risk retention provisions. First, TOBs are not based 
on the “originate to distribute” model that creates a moral 
 
180 See Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 64, at 7. 
181 See Keith R. Fisher, Ballard Spahr Discusses Risk Retention 
Rules, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 21, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law. 
columbia.edu/2014/11/21/ballard-spahr-discusses-risk-retention-rules 
[http://perma.cc/UB23-Z3S5]. 
182 See Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 64, at 7. 
183 Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,661 (Dec. 24, 2014) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373, 1234, 17 C.F.R. pt. 246, 24 
C.F.R. pt. 267). 
184 See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,716. 
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hazard for the sponsors of some securitization 
transactions.185 The moral hazard situation occurs when the 
sponsor would have the tendency to incur risks because 
another party—the investors—would shoulder the risks of 
the transaction.186 However, “TOB programs are almost 
uniformly used to finance municipal bonds, not to transfer 
risk.”187 Moreover, TOBs are not considered by the 
marketplace to be ABSs.188 Additionally, a TOB program 
“does not create information gaps for investors.”189 The 
concern that the SEC has with regards to ABS 
securitizations is that the underlying pool of assets in an 
ABS consists of hundreds and thousands of unrelated 
assets.190 In contrast, assets underlying TOBs are “high 
quality and are typically publicly issued, rated debt 
securities that are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws.”191 
Even if regulators will not grant a full exemption from 
risk retention provisions for TOBs, they can make mitigating 
changes in order to ensure that the TOB market remains 
innovative without sacrificing safety. This would be done by 
expanding the definition of a QTOB. As mentioned earlier, a 
complication relating to TOBs in the risk retention context is 
that traditional risk retention methods are not available to 
TOBs.192 Thus, the agencies have defined QTOBs, and have 
allowed them to satisfy the risk retention requirements via 
alternate means.193 TOB programs which do not qualify as 
 
185 See Ashurst LLP, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Credit 
Risk Retention 3 (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-14-
11/s71411-407.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZF5-TBBF]. 
186 See id. at 3 n.4. 
187 Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 64, at 6 n.19. 
188 See Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,660 (citing comment 
letters received in response to the proposed credit risk retention rule). 
189 See Ashurst LLP, supra note 185, at 3. 
190 See id. 
191 Inv. Co. Inst., supra note 64, at 6 n.19. 
192 See Gorman, supra note 22; Ashurst LLP, supra note 185, at 4. 
193 See SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, AGENCIES ADOPT FINAL DODD-FRANK RISK 
RETENTION RULES FOR ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 26 (Nov. 25, 2014), 
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QTOBs will not be able to take advantage of the modified 
risk-retention mechanisms, so they will essentially have to 
cease operating.194 Thus, the definition of a QTOB becomes 
crucial. A QTOB is a TOB issuer that has the following 
characteristics: 
[i]ssues no securities other than a single class of 
TOBs with a preferred variable return payable out of 
capital that itself meets the risk retention 
requirements; [h]olds only tax-exempt munis as 
assets and issues only securities, the income from 
which is tax-exempt to investors; [i]s collateralized 
solely by servicing assets and munis that are not 
subject to substitution and that have the same 
municipal issuer and the same underlying obligor or 
source of payment (without regard to any third-party 
creditor enhancement); [and h]as a legally binding 
commitment from a regulated liquidity provider to 
provide a 100 percent guaranty or liquidity coverage 
with respect to all outstanding TOBs.195 
Once a TOB satisfies the QTOB requirements, then 
residuals would qualify as qualified horizontal residual 
interests before a tender option termination event (“TOTE”) 
and as eligible vertical interests after a TOTE.196 
Additionally, a sponsor’s direct ownership of the same 
municipal bonds held as collateral by a TOB issuer may 
count towards the five percent risk retention requirement.197 
These mechanisms allow for TOBs to survive under the Risk 
Retention Rule, though the rule still limits the TOB market 




194 See Ashurst LLP, supra note 185, at 4 (“A sponsor of a non-
‘qualified’ TOB Program would very likely have to stop engaging in many 
transactions because it would not be in a position to comply with section 
15G at all.”). 
195 Gorman, supra note 22 (emphasis added). See also Credit Risk 
Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602, 77,659–60 (Dec. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 
12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373, 1234, 17 C.F.R. pt. 246, 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
196 See SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, supra note 193, at 26. 
197 See id. at 26–27. 
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In sum, TOBs provide municipalities with access to a 
diverse investor base and a more liquid market, and the risk 
retention requirements would significantly increase the costs 
of TOB programs and adversely affect state and local 
governments that indirectly receive funding through these 
programs.198 The risk retention provisions make sense in the 
context of other securitized products where there is a 
divergence of interests between the issuer and there are 
information gaps for investors, but these concerns do not 
exist for TOBs. Further, non-exemption will “decrease the 
availability of tax-exempt investments in the market for 
money market funds, which are continuing to face limited 
investment options due to constraints imposed by Rule 2a-7 
under the Investment Company Act.”199 To reiterate the 
general concerns regarding the benefits and drawbacks of 
the continued existence of TOB programs addressed in the 
previous section, TOBs worsened the condition of the 
municipal bond market, but they did not alone cause the 
yield inversion phenomenon.200 Additionally, TOB programs 
are being run in much safer ways than they were before the 
2008 financial crisis, with less leverage and better 
collateral.201 
V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
Current rulemaking relating to municipal bonds—the 
LCR, the Volcker Rule, and the Risk Retention Rule—has 
increased the costs of raising capital for municipalities. 
However, the increased costs do not bring about a significant 
improvement in the soundness and safety of the financial 
system. With that in mind, several recommendations follow. 
 
198 Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. at 77,660 (citing comment 
letters received in response to the proposed credit risk retention rule). 
199 Id. 
200 See Bergstresser, Cohen, and Shenai, supra note 60, at 3. 
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A. Classify Investment-Grade Municipal Bonds as 
Level 2A HQLAs 
With regards to the LCR and the corresponding HQLA 
requirement, the most liquid municipal bonds should be 
treated as Level 2A liquid assets. This treatment is 
consistent with Basel III and would match H.R. 2209. 
Municipal bonds compare favorably with two classes of debt 
included as HQLAs: investment-grade corporate bonds and 
GSEs. 
Municipal bonds are highly liquid, as they are convertible 
into cash with little or no loss of value during a period of 
liquidity stress.202 As noted earlier, municipal bonds compare 
favorably with corporate debt in terms of volatility, trading 
volume and ability to ascertain prices.203 Additionally, 
legislative history shows that municipal bonds are treated 
similarly to GSEs.204 Furthermore, the world’s supply of 
“safe” assets is increasingly limited, as the stock of “safe” 
assets shrank by almost half from 2007 to 2012, even as 
demand increased.205 Given this shrinking pool of safe 
assets, it will become even harder and more expensive for 
banks to obtain HQLA-eligible capital, which suggests it may 
make sense to make municipal bonds HQLA-eligible. 
Some argue the HQLA exclusion will have a minimal 
influence, since most banks have anticipated that municipal 
bonds would not qualify for HQLA status; thus, most banks 
have not been holding municipal bonds with liquidity in 
mind, but rather for a profit motive.206 Many big banks were 
able to meet the LCR requirements in September 2014 
 
202 Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, supra note 51, at 3. 
203 See supra notes 124–33 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra note 134 and accompanying text . 
205 See CREDIT SUISSE, 2012 GLOBAL OUTLOOK: PIECING TOGETHER OR 




206 See Jacobsen, supra note 138. 
MIKI – FINAL  
No. 1:252] LIVE AND LET DIE 293 
despite the treatment of municipal bonds.207 Further, many 
banks have already posted enough collateral to continue to 
hold their municipal investments.208 Finally, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch contends that only roughly half of the 
municipal bonds held by U.S. banks are held by banks large 
enough to be subject to the HQLA regulations.209 
However, the announcement in September that municipal 
bonds would not count towards the HQLA requirement for 
the time being has influenced the market.210 In the first nine 
months of 2014, municipal bond daily trading volume 
dropped from $4 billion to $3 billion.211 Additionally, not 
including municipal bonds as HQLA may not drive day-to-
day investment decisions, but it could affect long-term 
planning as banks allocate capital away from municipal 
bonds, and it may compel banks to sell off municipal bonds 
in times of market volatility, when issuers would most need 
support from banks.212 A financial crisis like the one in 2008 
may be unlikely to occur soon,213 but other liquidity events 
could force banks out of the municipal bond market. For 
instance, in 2013, following the announcement by Ben 
Bernanke, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, that the 
Federal Reserve would consider tapering its quantitative 
 
207 See Tracy, supra note 13 (“Regulators say banks are already well 
on their way to meeting the rules.”). 
208 See Topic of the Week: Banks as Municipal Advisors, MUNICIPAL 
ISSUER BRIEF (Mun. Mkt. Advisors), Sept. 22, 2014, at 2 [hereinafter MMA 
September]. 
209 See Michael Aneiro, BofA Sees Limited Harm To Munis From New 
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211 Colvin, supra note 139, at 2. 
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easing program, bond markets froze.214 Finally, in the past, 
banks have acted as the “buyers of last resort” during times 
of crisis, such as when municipal bond funds had to sell 
bonds at distressed prices to meet payment obligations.215 As 
banks have been forced to shrink their balance sheets, they 
may be even less inclined to act as the “buyer of last resort” 
if municipal bonds are not HQLA-eligible. 
One concern regards which municipal bonds should be 
incorporated as HQLAs, as regulations would essentially 
pick “winners” and “losers” from the municipal bond 
market.216 The standard outlined in 12 C.F.R. § 1.2 for 
assessing whether corporate bonds are investment grade 
may be a logical starting place for assessing municipal 
bonds,217 since credit agencies’ ratings cannot be used to 
make determinations of investment grade status.218 One fear 
is that the inability to use ratings may force regulators to 
decide whether something is appropriate for inclusion as 
HQLA based on factors such as the size of the 
municipality,219 meaning smaller municipal issuers whose 
bonds do not trade as widely are not likely to have their 
securities classified as HQLA.220 Senator Schumer has 
received some criticism for lobbying for the classification of 
municipal bonds as HQLA because his constituency, New 
York City, is a relatively respected issuer the bonds of which 
 
214 See Nicholos Venditti, The Hidden Risk in the Municipal Market, 
THORNBURG INV. MGMT., 1 (Sept. 2014), http://www.thornburg.com/ 
pdf/separate-accounts/TH3168_HiddenRisk_article.pdf [http://perma.cc/YX 
93-CP4F]. 
215 See id. 
216 MMA September, supra note 208. 
217 12 C.F.R. § 1.2(d) (2014) (“Investment grade means the issuer of a 
security has an adequate capacity to meet financial commitments under 
the security for the projected life of the asset or exposure. An issuer has an 
adequate capacity to meet financial commitments if the risk of default by 
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are very likely to qualify as HQLA.221 Thus, there is the 
potential that funding costs for smaller municipalities, those 
that do not have as much access to funding in the first place, 
will rise disproportionately compared to the rest of the 
municipal market. These effects might be mitigated, 
however, by the fact that local issuers may borrow from 
community and regional banks unaffected by the rules, 
whereas larger banks that are subject to the HQLA might 
already be investing in larger issues of municipal bonds.222 
Thus, the choosing of “winners” and “losers” should not have 
a bifurcating effect on the municipal bond market. 
Overall, the effect of the exclusion of municipal bonds, 
particularly in the short-term, may be limited, but there are 
signs that there may be undesirable long-term effects. The 
exclusion also does not make sense when considering what 
other asset classes are HQLA-eligible, such as corporate 
bonds, which are riskier and are not any more liquid than 
municipal bonds.223 The definition for “investment grade” 
outlined in 12 C.F.R. § 1.2 should be used to determine 
which municipal bonds are fit for inclusion as HQLAs, and 
those that meet the criteria should be deemed Level 2A 
liquid assets, consistent with the proposed policy of H.R. 
2209.224 
B. Exempt TOBs from the Volcker Rule “Covered 
Funds” Definition 
As analyzed earlier, good reasons exist to exempt TOBs 
from the Volcker Rule prohibitions on investments in 
“covered funds.” While TOBs did help to exacerbate the 
financial crisis and accelerate the destabilization of the 
municipal bond market, TOBs were not the instruments 
primarily responsible for the “yield inversion” phenomenon, 
and TOB programs are generally being run with lower 
 
221 See The Muni Bond Lobby, supra note 34. 
222 See MMA September, supra note 208. 
223 See Jacobsen, supra note 138. 
224 See H.R. 2209, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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leverage and stronger collateral in the post-crisis years.225 
TOBs are essentially a form of short-term financing in the 
municipal bond market, and they are actually safer than the 
municipal bonds themselves.226 While it is true that the TOB 
market is much smaller than the underlying municipal bond 
market, killing the market for TOBs would raise the costs of 
capital for municipalities by taking away a source of demand 
for municipal bonds.227 Eliminating the TOB market would 
also have negative ripple effects on money market mutual 
funds, which would be deprived of a source of safe, short-
term capital.228 
While it is understandable that rule-makers want to 
simplify Dodd-Frank when possible, there is good reason to 
separate how TOB trusts and other entities such as hedge 
funds are treated under the Volcker Rule. Regulators have 
relied on the fact that TOBs utilize the same exemption 
within the Investment Company Act as these other 
vehicles,229 Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment 
Company Act.230 These exclusions allow for exemptions from 
certain registration requirements for many securitization 
entities, including hedge funds and private equity funds, 
which Congress intended to be subject to Volcker Rule 
prohibitions.231 However, legislative history and other 
provisions in Dodd-Frank suggest that a more nuanced 
distinction is possible between the types of activities that are 
safe and those that the Volcker Rule sought to correct.232 The 
distinction between securitization entities and true “hedge 
funds” appears elsewhere in Dodd-Frank. Section 402 of the 
 
225 See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
226 See Hearing, supra note 95, at 73 (statement of Kenneth Gibbs). 
227 See id. 
228 See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, supra note 59. 
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Dodd-Frank Act distinguishes among “securitized asset 
funds,” true “hedge funds,” and “private equity funds,” which 
demonstrates that appropriate definitions of these terms are 
possible based on substantive distinctions rather than a 
common Investment Company Act exemption.233 
In the absence of an exemption for TOBs, there is the 
possibility that the joint venture TOB and the third-party 
TOB could step in to fill the void. As argued above, the 
language of the regulations supports the exemption of TOBs. 
The requirement under the Investment Company Act that 
the joint venture be capped at ten parties would not allow for 
banks to split the residual into many smaller internal funds, 
a common practice, but would still allow the TOB structure 
to exist.234 Given the ten-party cap imposed upon joint 
ventures for TOBs, it would be preferable if TOBs were 
granted an exemption from the Volcker Rule regulations. 
While the third-party TOB structure does not carry the same 
kind of risks that the joint venture structure does, it is a 
solution that is unworkable for banks. Banks will have to 
hand over functions essential to running TOBs to residual 
holders, and it is not necessary to relegate banks to merely 
providing support roles in a business that does not pose 
systematic risks to the financial system. Given how crucial 
the TOB market has been––through increasing demand for 
longer-dated municipal bonds, exerting downward pressure 
on the long end of the municipal yield curve, and lowering 
borrowing costs for state and local governments––it is likely 
that the TOB market will continue under either the third-
party or joint venture structure.235 However, the regulations 
unnecessarily force a restructuring of TOB programs. 
C. Exempt TOBs from the Risk Retention Rule 
Exempting TOBs entirely from the Risk Retention Rule 
makes the most sense, though at the very least, there are 
further modifications that could be made to better reflect the 
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risk profile of TOBs and current market practices. TOBs are 
not the type of synthetic derivative instruments that the 
Risk Retention Rule was aimed at regulating. 
One change that could have mitigated some of the 
negative consequences of the Risk Retention Rule, 
particularly with respect to minimizing the cost of raising 
capital for municipalities and maintaining high levels of 
innovation in the TOB market, relates to the type of 
underlying assets composing TOBs.236 Comment letters on 
proposed TOB rulemaking have suggested expanding the 
scope of QTOB-eligible TOBs to those that have municipal 
bonds from more than one issuer, or expanding the scope of 
eligible underlying securities to taxable municipal bonds and 
preferred shares of registered closed-end investment funds 
that primarily invest in municipal bonds.237 Supporters of 
expansion contend that the moral hazard problem is 
addressed because the credit profiles are similar to 
municipal bonds and market participants view these assets 
as a part of the TOB universe.238 To counter, regulators 
suggest that expanding the rules would lead to issuers 
gaming the Risk Retention Rule by cramming assets into 
TOBs that are not fit for them.239 Further, the majority of 
TOBs on the market only have municipal bonds from the 
same issuer as its underlying asset.240 
Recognizing that there are concerns with issuers 
potentially “gaming” the Risk Retention Rule, there are still 
some good reasons to allow for a more diverse set of 
underlying assets to qualify as QTOBs. First, only allowing 
TOBs that have a single issuer could hurt smaller 
municipalities, which do not issue enough municipal bonds 
on their own to create a TOB. Furthermore, not allowing 
taxable municipal bonds and closed-end investment funds 
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237 See id. at 4. 
238 See id. at 4–5. 
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would increase funding costs for municipalities by restricting 
the creation of innovative products that are more in line with 
the realities of the market. For example, Build America 
Bonds, a type of bond that has been packaged in a TOB, are 
taxable bond issuances where the federal government 
reimburses thirty-five percent of the interest paid, making it 
a cost-effective way of raising money for municipalities.241 
Besides the tax treatment, taxable TOBs are identical in 
structure to traditional TOBs, and therefore do not present 
novel risks compared to traditional TOBs, assuming that the 
bond or bonds being securitized are of high quality.242 
Taxable TOBs linked to Build America Bonds were 
introduced in 2010, healthy demand for the product resulted, 
and the TOB stepped into a void where there was not an 
active repurchase market for taxable municipal bonds.243 
However, under the risk retention provisions, these types of 
TOBs could no longer exist. The TOB market, estimated at a 
relatively small $75 billion in 2012, was $175 billion in size 
at its peak, so the TOB market could easily become more 
significant depending upon market conditions.244 
It is submitted, however, that the most sensible choice 
would be to exempt TOBs from the Risk Retention Rule 
entirely. TOBs did not trigger the financial crisis that led to 
the enactment of Section 15G in the first place,245 and TOBs 
are fundamentally different from products traditionally 
designated as ABSs.246 The ability of an issuer of ABSs to 
enforce its security interest in the underlying assets may be 
limited, which is not the case with TOBs.247 The underlying 
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bonds in a TOB “generally are from one original issuance 
and have the same issuer and borrower/obligor”; investors 
analyze the credit risk of the underlying borrower as they 
would for any other municipal investment.248 Moreover, 
“TOBs typically are backed by a liquidity facility provided by 
a highly rated financial institution,” and there is liquidity 
that is not found with typical structured finance products 
that are the subject of the Risk Retention Rule.249 Subjecting 
TOBs to the Risk Retention Rule seems particularly 
inconsistent considering the treatment of Qualified 
Residential Mortgages (“QRMs”) embedded in the rule.250 
Essentially, there is an exemption for mortgages that are of 
highest quality.251 In the final rules, some of the toughest 
qualifications to obtain the QRM exemption, including a 
requirement that a residential mortgage have at least a 
twenty-percent down payment, were abandoned.252 This is on 
top of the exemption for “community-focused” mortgages and 
the exemption that already existed for mortgages issued by 
GSEs (i.e., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae).253 It 
is inconsistent that a transparent investment vehicle with 
highly rated securities underlying it, such as TOBs, would be 
subject to more stringent risk retention requirements than 
mortgages that have no down payments. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The motives behind the Dodd-Frank Act and the liquidity 
rules––preventing the excessive risk taking that led to the 
financial crisis and improving the banking sector’s ability to 
absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress––
are sound.254 However, the municipal bond exclusion from 
HQLA eligibility, the Volcker Rule prohibition on TOBs, and 
the Risk Retention Rule as it applies to TOBs do not provide 
protections against excessive risk taking or provide for a 
more sound banking system while raising financing costs for 
municipalities. Particularly compared to other asset classes 
that are more lightly regulated or other asset classes with 
which municipal bonds are lumped together, municipal 
bonds are treated harshly. Despite a recent increase in 
municipal bankruptcies, municipal bonds remain a relatively 
safe asset class. Higher financing costs for municipalities 
may have undesirable effects, as they would leave 
municipalities with less capital to maintain assets and could 
have potentially harmful spillover effects into industries 
such as construction.255 In sum, the existing municipal bond 
regulation framework under the Dodd-Frank Act should be 
modified in the following ways: the most liquid municipal 
bonds should be considered assets eligible for HQLA 
inclusion, and TOBs should be exempt from both the Volcker 
Rule and the risk retention provisions. 
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